The Relationship Between Capital Structure

And Concentrated Ownership

(Agency-Related Problems) by Chee , Hong Kok
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
AND CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP  
(AGENCY-RELATED PROBLEMS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHEE HONG KOK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITI SAINS MALAYSIA 
 
2010 
 
 
 
 
 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE 
AND CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP  
(AGENCY-RELATED PROBLEMS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
by 
 
 
CHEE HONG KOK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
June  2010 
 
 
 
 
 
  ii 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
Foremost, I am extremely thankful and indebted to my supervisor, Professor 
Dr Fauziah Bt. Md. Taib, for the great help she has provided. She has 
provided excellent supervision, patience and has been a constant sounding 
board of ideas and critical comments which have been invaluable in 
broadening my knowledge. Without her strong support, I would not have 
completed this study. I take this opportunity to express my deepest 
appreciation and gratitude to her. 
 
Next, I wish to thank Professor Dato’ Dr Daing Nasir Ibrahim, now Vice-
Chancellor of Universiti Malaysia Pahang and the former Dean of the  School 
of Management for his moral support. Others who have helped in many ways 
were Professor I.M. Pandey, Associate Professor Dato’ Dr Ishak Ismail (Dean 
of the School of Management), Professor Datin Dr Hasnah Haron (Dean of 
the Graduate School of Business), Associate Professor Dr Zamri, Associate 
Professor T. Ramayah, Associate Professor Dr Zainal, Dr Sofri, Dr Effiezal, Dr 
Roselee, Dr Augustinus Setiawan, Dr Buyung Sarita, Puan Rusnah and 
Joshua. 
 
I am also thankful to Dr Neoh Soon Kean, Chairman of Dynaquest Sdn Bhd, 
for generously allowing me access to the research facilities at his firm. My 
special thanks goes to Poh Cheng, Vivian and  Phaik Choon for their kind 
assistance. 
 
Last but not the least, I wish to thank my wife, Lee Kean, children Hui Yin, Hui 
Jun, Wei Jien and my parents for their patience and moral support during the 
time taken to complete this thesis.                 
  
   iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
  
 Page 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS  iii 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES ix 
LIST OF APPENDICES x 
ABSTRAK xii 
ABSTRACT  xiii 
                                                                                                                                                    
CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Introduction 1 
1.1 Background 3 
1.2 Problem Statement  5 
1.3 Objectives of  the study 8 
1.4 Research questions  10 
1.5 Contribution of  the study   10 
1.6 Scope of the study 12 
1.7 Organization of the study 13 
   
 
CHAPTER 2:  AGENCY CONFLICTS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE  
                        PATTERNS IN MALAYSIA 
 
2.0 Introduction 15 
2.1 Agency conflicts 15 
2.2 Corporate financing in Malaysia 17 
2.3 External financing by the corporate sector  19 
2.4 Funds raised by Malaysian listed firms    21 
2.5 Debt ratio trends    22 
2.6 Views from practitioners    26 
   iv 
                                                                                                                      Page 
 
 
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT  
 
3.0 Introduction 28 
3.1 Theoretical literature  28 
 3.1.1     Trade-off theory  28 
 3.1.2     Pecking order hypothesis 29 
 3.1.3     Signalling theory 31 
 3.1.4     Agency theory 32 
 3.1.4.1       Moral hazard 33 
3.2 Empirical literature 34 
 3.2.1     United States studies 34 
 3.2.2     International comparisons 35 
 3.2.3     Emerging market studies 37 
 3.2.3.1       Malaysia 37 
 3.2.4     Asia-Pacific studies 39 
 3.2.4.1       Australia 39 
 3.2.4.2       China 40 
 3.2.4.3       Hong Kong 40 
 3.2.4.4       India 41 
 3.2.4.5       Indonesia 41 
 3.2.4.6       Japan 42 
 3.2.4.7       Singapore 42 
 3.2.4.8       Thailand 43 
3.3 Hypotheses development   43 
 3.3.1     Managerial or directors’ ownership  44 
 3.3.2     Ownership concentration 48 
 3.3.3     Foreign ownership 49 
 3.3.4     Politically connected firms 51 
 3.3.5     Asset tangibility 52 
   v 
  Page 
   
 3.3.6     Growth opportunities 54 
 3.3.7     Dividends 55 
 3.3.8     Profitability 57 
 3.3.9     Control variables 57 
 3.3.10   Industry effect 59 
      3.4     Summary of selected empirical research on capital structure               60  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Introduction 68 
4.1 Sample selection  68 
4.2 Sources of data    72 
4.3 Variables measurement    75 
4.4 Regression models 82 
4.5 Approach to data analysis  87 
   
 
CHAPTER 5: DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL STRUCTURE, AGENCY COSTS 
                       AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
 
5.0 Introduction 88 
5.1 Descriptive statistics  88 
5.2 Test of assumptions underlying panel data analysis    98 
 5.2.1   Test of normality 98 
 5.2.2   Test of multicollinearity 99 
 5.2.3   Test of heteroscedasticity 106 
 5.2.4   Test of autocorrelation  108 
 5.2.5    Unit root test 109 
   
   
   vi 
  Page 
   
5.3 The Goodness of fit or model fit 110 
 5.3.1   Coefficient of Determination (R-square) 111 
 5.3.2 Adjusted Coefficient of Determination (Adjusted R- 
            square) 
112 
    5.4 Selection of model for analysis (Hausman Test) 112 
5.5 The relationship between capital structure, ownership structure 
and agency costs: overall period (1993-2003). 
114 
5.6 The relationship between capital structure, ownership structure 
and agency costs: pre-crisis sub-period (1993-1996). 
118 
5.7 The relationship between capital structure, ownership structure 
and agency costs: during crisis sub-period (1997-1998). 
120 
5.8 The relationship between capital structure, ownership  structure 
and agency costs: post-crisis sub-period (1999-2003). 
121 
5.9 Sensitivity  checks   122 
 5.9.1    Family dummy results 124 
 5.9.2    Test for curvilinear relationship results 126 
 5.9.3    Random effects model results 129 
 5.9.4    Managerial ownership dummy model results 131 
 5.9.5    Ownership concentration dummy model results 133 
 5.9.6    Foreign ownership dummy model results 135 
 5.9.7    Ownership concentration when family member sits on  
              the board model results 137 
 5.9.8    Direct managerial ownership model  results 139 
5.10 Performance model based on accounting  measure results 141 
5.11 Performance model based on market-based  measure results 145 
   
   
   
   
   vii 
  Page 
   
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
 
6.0         Introduction 146 
6.1         Discussion of main findings  146 
6.2         Summary of findings 166 
 
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.0 Introduction 168 
7.1 Restatement of research objectives  168 
7.2 Conclusions of analysis  169 
7.3 Implications of  the study  170 
7.4 Limitation of the Study 171 
7.5 Suggestions for future research 173 
 
 
REFERENCES   176 
  
 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1.1 External financing patterns in selected Asian and 
developed countries 
3 
Table 1.2 Ownership concentration in selected East Asian countries 6 
Table 2.1 Ownership structure in the United States and Malaysia  17 
Table 2.2 External finance raised by the corporate sector  19 
Table 2.3 Funds raised by Malaysian listed firms (in RM million) 22 
Table 2.4 Annual trend of debt ratios  23 
Table 2.5 Debt ratios of selected developed and developing 
countries (1998-2001) 
26 
   
   viii 
 Page 
   
Table 3.1 Summary of selected empirical research on capital 
structure   
61 
Table 4.1 Summary of Main Board sample selection procedures 70 
Table 4.2 Sectoral distribution of sample firms 72 
Table 4.3 Measurement of variables – a summary 80 
Table 5.1a Descriptive statistics of overall period (1993-2003) 89 
Table 5.1b Descriptive statistics of pre-crisis period (1993-1996)  89 
Table 5.1c Descriptive statistics of crisis period (1997- 1998) 90 
Table 5.1d Descriptive statistics of post-crisis period (1999-2003) 90 
Table 5.2 Foreign ownership of public listed firms in selected East 
Asian countries 
93 
Table 5.3 Descriptive statistics by sector of overall period (1993-
2003) 
97 
Table 5.4a Correlation matrix of overall period (1993-2003) 102 
Table 5.4b Correlation matrix of pre-crisis period (1993-1996) 103 
Table 5.4c Correlation matrix of crisis period (1997-1998) 104 
Table 5.4d Correlation matrix for post-crisis period (1999-2003) 105 
Table 5.5    Results of heteroscedasticity tests 107 
Table 5.6 Results of autocorrelation tests 109 
Table 5.7 Results of unit root tests 110 
Table 5.8 Summary of model fit 111 
Table 5.9 Summary of random effects tests (Hausman tests) 113 
Table 5.10 Regression results of main model   114 
Table 5.11   Regression results of main model with family dummy   124 
Table 5.12   Regression results of curvilinear relationship  127 
Table 5.13   Regression results of main model using random effects 
method   
129 
Table 5.14   Regression results of main model using managerial 
ownership dummy   
131 
   ix 
   
   
  Page 
   
Table 5.15   Regression results of main model using ownership 
concentration  dummy    
133 
Table 5.16   Regression results of main model using foreign ownership 
dummy 
135 
Table 5.17   Regression results of main model using ownership 
concentration when family member sits on the board 
137 
Table 5.18   Regression results of main model using direct managerial 
ownership 
139 
Table 5.19   Regression results of performance model based on 
accounting measure 
141 
Table 5.20 Regression results of performance model based on 
market-based measure 
145 
Table 6.1 Real Gross Domestic Product growth  148 
Table 6.2 Trend of managerial shareholdings  154 
Table 6.3 Trend of ownership concentration 157 
Table 6.4 Trend of foreign ownership  159 
Table 7.1   Statement of hypotheses and outcomes of test results  169 
 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1 Debt ratio trend of  Malaysian firms   25 
Figure 6.1    Foreign ownership, managerial ownership and ownership 
concentration trends  
160 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   x 
                                                                                                                                   Page 
 
 
LIST OF APPENDICES 
 
Appendix A     List of Main Board sample firms (179 firms) 189 
Appendix B.1     Descriptive statistics (1993-2003) 194 
Appendix B.2 Descriptive statistics (1993-1996) 194 
Appendix B.3 Descriptive statistics  (1997-1998) 195 
Appendix B.4 Descriptive statistics  (1999-2003) 195 
Appendix C.1 Residuals of main model (1993-2003) 196 
Appendix C.2 Residuals of main model (1993-1996) 198 
Appendix C.3 Residuals of main model (1997-1998) 200 
Appendix C.4 Residuals of main model (1999-2003) 202 
Appendix D.1 Correlation matrix (1993-2003) 203 
Appendix D.2 Correlation matrix (1993-1996) 204 
Appendix D.3 Correlation matrix (1997-1998) 205 
Appendix D.4 Correlation matrix (1999-2003) 206 
Appendix E.1 Regression results of main model (1993-2003) 207 
Appendix E.2 Regression results of main model (1993-1996) 208 
Appendix E.3 Regression results of main model (1997-1998) 209 
Appendix E.4 Regression results of main model (1999-2003) 210 
Appendix F.1 Regression results of family dummy model (1993-2003) 211 
Appendix F.2 Regression results of curvilinear model (1993-2003)   212 
Appendix F.3 Regression results of random effects model (1993-2003)  213 
Appendix F.4 Regression results of managerial ownership dummy   214 
 model (1999-2003)  
Appendix F.5 Regression results of ownership concentration dummy 215 
 Model (1999-2003)  
Appendix F.6 Regression results of foreign ownership    216 
 model (1999-2003)  
   
   xi 
   
  Page 
   
Appendix F.7 Regression results of ownership concentration when  217 
 member sits on the board model (1993-2003)   
Appendix F.8 Regression results of direct managerial model (1993-2003)  218 
Appendix F.9 Regression results of performance model (1993-2003)  219 
Appendix G.1 Regression results of market-based measure of 
performance model (1993-2003) 
220 
Appendix H.1 Hausman test for main model (1993-2003) 221 
Appendix H.2 Hausman test for main model (1993-1996) 222 
Appendix H.3 Hausman test for main model (1997-1998) 223 
Appendix H.4 Hausman test for main model (1999-2003) 224 
Appendix I.1 Heteroscedasticity test for main model (1993-2003)               225 
Appendix I.2 Heteroscedasticity test for main model (1993-1996)    227 
Appendix I.3 Heteroscedasticity test for main model (1997-1998)      229 
Appendix I.4 Heteroscedasticity test for main model (1999-2003)      231 
Appendix J.1 Unit root test for main model (1993-2003) 233 
Appendix J.2 Unit root test for main model (1993-1996) 234 
Appendix J.3 Unit root test for main model (1997-1998) 235 
Appendix J.4 Unit root test for main model (1999- 2003) 236 
Appendix K.1 Market-based performance model – Histogram of residuals 
(2003)  
237 
Appendix K.2 Market-based performance model – Scatterplot (2003) 237 
Appendix L Chronology of important events (1993-2003) 238 
   
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
xii 
PERKAITAN DI ANTARA STRUKTUR MODAL DAN PEMILIKAN 
TERPUSAT (MASALAH BERKAITAN AGENSI)  
 
ABSTRAK 
 
Malaysia terkenal dengan pemilikan firma yang terpusat dan ini 
mempunyai kelebihan dalam mengurangkan masalah perbezaan maklumat 
tetapi membawa masalah berkaitan agensi seperti pemidahan risiko, 
pembinaan empayar dan kurang usaha. Untuk ini, kajian ini cuba memastikan 
sama ada tahap hutang (tahap struktur modal syarikat di Malaysia) 
dipengaruhi oleh masalah berkaitan agensi atau merupakan suatu 
mekanisma pemantauan yang berkesan. Kajian dari negara yang mempunyai 
struktur pemilikan yang hampir sama seperti Indonesia di mana pemantauan 
adalah kurang berkesan (Taridi, 1999) dan di Thailand  pemantauan didapati 
berkesan (Wiwattanakantang, 1999) Malaysia memerlukan kajian khusus 
kerana undang-undang perlindungan pelabur adalah lebih ketat (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
Tesis ini mengkaji hubungkait di antara struktur modal dan pemilikan 
terpusat (masalah berkaitan agensi). Dengan menggunakan kaedah analisis 
data panel, 179 firma yang disenaraikan di Papan Utama Bursa Malaysia di 
antara 1993 dan 2003 telah dikaji. Bukti daripada kajian ini menunjukkan 
bahawa pemilikan pihak pengurusan tidak mempunyai hubungkait yang 
signifikan dengan nisbah hutang dan ini bermaksud bahawa pemilikan pihak 
pengurusan tidak menggunakan hutang sebagai alat pemantauan dan tidak 
menggunakan hutang untuk mengekalkan kawalan mereka ke atas firma. 
Pemilikan pihak pengurusan yang lebih tinggi menghasilkan keuntungan yang 
lebih bagi firma dan ini menolak berlakunya masalah agensi Jenis II (konflik di 
antara pemilik selaku pengurus dan pemilikan yang kecil). Pemilikan terpusat 
yang sangat tinggi didapati berkesan di dalam memantau pihak pengurusan. 
Perkara yang sama juga didapati benar mengenai pemilikan pelabur asing. 
Bukti tentang masalah bahaya moral tidak di dapati tentang ketaraan aset. 
Kajian ini juga tidak mendapati kesan konflik agensi Jenis II melalui 
keuntungan. Juga tidak dapat dibuktikan bahawa berlakunya pemindahan 
kekayaan (satu lagi masalah agensi Jenis II) melalui dividen.   
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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND 
CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP (AGENCY-RELATED PROBLEMS) 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Malaysia is known for its highly concentrated ownership structure. The 
highly concentrated ownership structure brings an advantage of having less 
asymmetric information but at the same time is said to be prone to agency-
related problems such as risk shifting, empire building and shirking. 
Therefore, the study is undertaken to ascertain if the level of debt (capital 
structure level) of Malaysian companies are heavily influenced by the agency-
related problems or create an efficient monitoring mechanism. Through 
previous studies from countries with similar ownership structure such as 
Indonesia (Taridi, 1999) and Thailand (Wiwattanakantang, 1999) show no 
monitoring mechanism and having monitoring mechanism respectively, 
Malaysia warrants a special investigation as her investor protection law is 
better than those of the two mentioned countries (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
This  study addresses the relationship between capital structure and 
concentrated ownership (agency-related problems). Using panel data analysis 
methodolgy, 179 Malaysian listed Main Board firms covering a period of 11 
years from 1993 to 2003 were examined. Managerial ownership did not have 
a significant relationship with debt ratio implying that debt is not used as a 
monitoring device and at the same time debt was not used to maintain control 
over their firm. Evidence from this study suggests that managerial ownership 
resulted in higher profitability and this rejects the presence of Type II agency 
problems (conflicts between owner-manager and minority shareholders). High 
ownership concentration was found to be an effective control device. The 
same goes for foreign ownership. There was no evidence of moral hazard 
problems in the form of asset tangibility in this study. This study did not find 
the presence of Type II agency conflicts via measures like profitabilty.  Also, 
there was no evidence of wealth transfer (a form of Type II agency problems) 
through dividends. 
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CHAPTER  1   
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter gives an overview of the research agenda. The discussion 
begins with some background of the capital structure studies, problem 
statement, objectives of the study, research questions, contribution of the 
study, scope of the study and finally, the organization of the study. 
According to Brealey, Myers and Allen (2006 p.445), capital structure is 
defined as the “firm’s mix of debt and equity financing”. Myers (2001) 
described capital structure as the mix of securities and financing sources used 
by corporations to finance real investment. Others like Megginson (1997) 
defined capital structure as the relative combination of debt and equity 
securities in the long-term financial structure of a firm. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) defined debt as a contract in which a borrower obtains some funds 
from the lender and promises to make pre-specified future payments to the 
lender.  
Smith and Warner (1979) stated that in the case of debt, the borrower 
usually promises not to breach a range of covenants for example, maintaining 
the value of assets of the firm. An important feature of debt is that if the 
borrower fails to adhere to the debt contract, the transfer of some control 
rights from the borrower to the lender is triggered. In the context of this study, 
debt refers to the borrowings made by companies and their promise to make 
regular interest payments and to repay the principal or interest-bearing debt, 
in short.  
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On paper, there ought to be a separation between ownership and 
control for example companies in the West but this separation may not be as 
clear cut especially in developing countries owing to the existence of family-
controlled firms. This is because the top management (or the directors) of the 
firm usually owns some of the equity in the firm they manage.  
Ownership structure has been defined as the identities of the 
company’s shareholders and the size of their shareholdings according to 
Denis and McConnell (2003). Bursa Malaysia defines equity as representing 
part ownership of the owner’s capital in a business. Frank and Goyal (2003a) 
considered that from an outside investor’s viewpoint equity is riskier than debt. 
Denis and McConnell (2003) argued that ownership structure is a potentially 
important determinant of corporate governance and hence capital structure. 
         The study of capital structure was initiated by Nobel laurettes Modigliani 
and Miller (1958 and 1963) who propounded the irrelevance of capital 
structure and the tax shield advantage which later paved the way for the 
development of alternative theories and empirical studies. The alternative 
theories include the trade-off theory, pecking order hypothesis, agency theory 
and signalling theory. The study of capital structure seeks to increase our 
knowledge as to whether capital structure matters (that is whether the total 
market value of a firm can change by changing the mix of debt and equity).  
In the mid-Nineties, several international studies on capital structure 
emerged but their studies had largely been confined to the developed 
countries especially in the United States, for example, Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) and Wald (1999).  As for the developing countries like in South-East 
Asia, there is limited empirical research on capital structure for example, in 
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Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-
Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) and Deesomsak, Paudyal and Pescetto (2004) 
were among the few international studies on capital structure focusing on 
developing countries. 
 
1.1      Background 
 
Table 1.1  
External financing patterns in selected Asian and developed countries  
 
 Internal 
finance 
External 
finance 
Bank 
finance 
Equity Operations 
finance 
Others 
China 67.38 32.62 10.67 2.56 3.95 15.44 
Germany 52.59 47.41 14.30 19.85 1.43 11.83 
Indonesia 79.53 20.47 16.09 0.00 2.19 2.19 
Malaysia 42.39 57.61 16.27 10.88 24.57 5.88 
Singapore 60.93 39.07 24.07 7.13 6.02 1.85 
United  
Kingdom 
60.88 39.12 14.53 9.49 9.61 5.50 
United  
States 
53.54 46.46 20.33 3.04 10.59 12.50 
 
Figures are in percentages and firm averages from 1995-1999 for each country and they are the 
proportion of investment financed from each source. Internal finance sources includes retained earnings 
or funds from family and friends. External finance sources comprises financing from banks, equity, 
operations finance and others. Bank finance includes financing from domestic as well as foreign banks. 
Operations finance is the sum of leasing and supplier credit. Others include financing from development 
banks, money lenders, public sector and other sources.  
 
Sources: Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2002) and The World Bank (1999). 
 
Table 1.1 shows the external and internal financing patterns in several 
Asian and developed countries. Among the selected countries, Malaysia was 
the only country that used more external finance than internal finance 
between 1995 to 1999. This situation could be due to the mix between 
business and politics especially in Malaysia. Among the examples are listed 
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The New Straits Times Berhad which is controlled by the ruling United Malay 
National Organization (UMNO) party and another listed firm, Cahya Mata 
Sarawak Berhad, is a family company controlled by the Chief Minister of 
Sarawak. It is noted that Malaysian firms used the largest percentage of 
external funds (57.6%) mainly sourced from operations finance (leasing and 
supplier credit) and bank financing. 
In Malaysia, internal finance made up the smaller proportion (42.39%) 
of total finance among the selected firms. Surprisingly, Indonesia used the 
largest proportion of internal finance (79.53%) in the sampled countries. 
Generally, developed countries used between 50%-60% of internal finance 
but the developing countries have a significant wider variation in the use of 
internal finance ranging from 42.4% (Malaysia) to as high as 79.5% (China).  
Bank financing was the most popular type of financing in Singapore while in 
China, bank financing was the least popular. In terms of equity financing, 
Malaysia was ranked the second highest (10.9%) after Germany (19.9%) 
whereas Indonesia was the lowest (0%). In terms of funding from operations 
finance, Malaysia was ranked the highest (24.6%) while Germany was ranked 
the lowest (1.4%).  
Pedersen and Thomsen (2003) in their study of ownership structure 
identified two types of agency conflicts that is conflicts between managers (or 
directors) and shareholders and the conflicts between majority (or controlling) 
shareholders and minority shareholders which Chu (2007) also categorized as 
Type I and Type II agency conflicts respectively. Type I agency conflicts 
represent the conflicts that are prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon countries where 
the conflict of interest is mainly between managers who are powerful on one 
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hand and the dispersed shareholders on the other hand. The other type of 
conflict which is prevalent among the European and East Asian setting refers 
to the conflict between controlling majority shareholders (controlling owners) 
and the weak minority shareholders. This shows that different economic 
systems and other institutional background caused variations in ownership 
structure.  In Malaysia, it is more likely that the Type II agency conflicts are 
more prevalent owing to the concentrated ownership structure where the 
majority shareholders are also involved in the management of the firms.  
 
1.2       Problem Statement 
 
Malaysia is considered as an emerging market with its unique multi-
ethnic society. As a result of this unique identity, Malaysian firms have a 
distinctive ownership structure. The key features of Malaysian public listed 
firms are ownership by several major ethnic origins, high ownership 
concentration, relatively high foreign ownership and is dominated by family 
founded businesses (Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 1999).  For example, 
Table 1.2 showed that Malaysia was ranked among the highest in terms of 
ownership concentration (58.8% based on top five shareholders in 1998) 
among the selected East Asian countries. The advantage of high ownership 
concentration is that there is less asymmetric problems due to the alignment 
of interests between managers and shareholders as propounded by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). On the other hand, the existence of high ownership 
concentration could bring about a host of other agency problems or moral 
hazard behaviour and these could be in the form of risk shifting, empire 
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building, perquisite consumption and managerial entrenchment at the 
expense of shareholders and other stakeholders’ wealth (Megginson, 1997). 
 
Table 1.2  
Ownership concentration in selected East Asian countries  
 
Country Concentration Ratio (%)1  Year end Company coverage 
 Largest 
shareholder 
Top five  
shareholders 
  
     
Indonesia 48.2 67.5 1997 All PLCs 
Korea 20.4 38.5 1998 81 non-financial 
PLCs2 
Malaysia 30.3 58.8 1998 All PLCs 
Philippines 33.5 60.2 1997 All non-financial 
PLCs 
Thailand 28.5 56.6 1997 All PLCs 
China3 N.A. 58.1 1995 316 PLCs 
 
1  Defined as the percentage of total issued shares of an average PLC owned by  the largest or top five 
   shareholders.  The percentages are not weighted by market capitalization. 
2  Based on the ownership data from the Asian Development Bank survey of 81 non-financial PLCs. 
   Comparable ownership data for the other countries are not available. 
3  Based on Shanghai Stock Exchange only. 
N.A. = Not available.    
PLC refers to public listed companies. 
 
Sources: Capulong, Edwards, Webb and Zhuang (2000 p.22) and Xu and Wang (1999). 
 
Capital structure studies have examined the types of agency conflicts 
that confront countries with high ownership concentration. Typically there 
were instances when ownership concentration yielded was viewed positively 
(Wiwattanakantang, 1999) and there were instances when ownership 
concentration was viewed negatively due to asymmetric information 
arguments for example Taridi (1999) in the case of Indonesia and Alba, 
Claessens, and Djankov (1998) in the case of Thailand.  
Studies on ownership structure and agency costs and its relationship 
with capital structure is important because it is closely linked to firm value. 
Unlike in the West, Malaysia being a developing country, the issue of agency-
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related problems is likely to be greater than that of developed countries. This 
is because companies in Malaysia are mainly majority controlled by a small 
group of related parties and managed by owner-managers (The World Bank, 
2005). As a result, the conflict of interests is not so much between managers 
(agents) and shareholders as in the West but is between the majority 
shareholders or inside managers and minority shareholders or Type II 
conflicts. The severity of agency-related problems is expected to be less than 
the other developing countries in South-East Asia such as Indonesia and 
Thailand due to better investor protection in Malaysia (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
Thus, it is of interest to study if the decision to have more debt is 
influenced by the extent of the concentration in ownership among Malaysian 
companies. This will provide some answers with regards to the issues such as 
potential agency-related problems which are often associated with greater 
degree of ownership concentration. 
It may also be interesting to empirically examine whether politically 
connected firms have a significant relationship on financing decisions. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that owing to their strong ties with powerful 
ruling politicians, politically connected firms may be in a more favourable 
position than non-politically connected firms in terms of being given easier 
access to loans.  
In summary, the study proposes to examine the potential agency-
related problems arising out of concentrated ownership including political 
connections.  
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1.3      Objectives of  the study 
 
Currently, as far as can be gathered, there are few empirical research 
studies related to agency theory, ownership structure and capital structure 
decisions in Malaysia. The agency theory has been examined together with 
ownership structure on financing decisions (capital structure) as the two are 
interlinked. The existing empirical research on Malaysian capital structure 
have mainly focused on the effect of firm or industry characteristics on capital 
structure.  
The effect of ownership structure on capital structure have also 
emerged recently but had not been thoroughly examined unlike in the West. 
For example, Pandey (2004) and Ahmad-Zaluki, Abdullah, Abidin, Ali and 
Arshad (2002) had incorporated ownership diffusion and managerial/directors’ 
ownership respectively in their studies. Pandey (2004) used a crude measure 
of ownership concentration by using the number of shares instead of the more 
commonly used measures like the percentage of largest shareholder, the 
percentage of top five largest shareholder or percentage of the top ten largest 
shareholdings (Mehran, 1992). Ahmad-Zaluki et al. (2002) measured 
managerial/directors’ ownership using only the direct directors’ shareholdings 
and did not include managers’ indirect shareholdings. Hence, there exist a 
gap in our knowledge of capital structure in a developing country like Malaysia 
as far as the effect of agency-related problems on capital structure is 
concerned. According to Pushner (1995 p.244), the effect of ownership 
structure on leverage is “still not clear” and that it is a “fertile topic for empirical 
testing”. Hence, this study seeks to fill this gap in Malaysia. 
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As ownership is not dispersed but concentrated in the hands of a few 
large shareholders, this brings about agency problems. This study tries to 
examine if the differences in ownership structure in Malaysia which is the 
unique attribute differs from the Western companies have the same impact on 
corporate financing decisions.   
This study has been motivated by ideas provided by Mehran (1992), 
Wiwattanakantang (1999), Capulong et al. (2000), Brailsford, Oliver and Pua 
(2002) and Pandey (2002). Mehran (1992) stressed that capital structure 
models that ignore agency costs/agency problems are incomplete. Pandey 
(2004) suggested a study be conducted on the role of ownership structure 
and agency costs problems (that is the conflicts between shareholders-
managers and shareholders-debtholders) on debt policy among Malaysian 
firms. Capulong et al. (2000) argued that agency cost is a factor “related but 
slightly different” from other influences of corporate financing.  
The research objectives of the study can be summarized as follows: 
 1.  To investigate the relationship between managerial shareholdings and 
      debt  level (capital structure decisions). 
2.  To investigate the relationship between ownership concentration and debt 
      level (capital structure decisions). 
3.  To examine the relationship between foreign ownership and debt level 
     (capital structure decisions). 
4.  To examine the relationship between politically connected firms and debt 
      level (capital structure decisions). 
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1.4       Research questions 
 
This study seeks to identify agency problems or moral hazard 
behaviour and the effect of ownership structure on capital structure decisions 
that is: 
1.    What is the role of managerial shareholdings with respect to debt ratio? 
2.   Does ownership concentration affect the debt ratio? 
3.   Does foreign ownership affect debt ratio? 
4.   Does politically connected firms influence debt ratio? 
            
            Answers to all these questions will shed some light onto the 
relationship between agency-related problems and capital structure decisions.  
 
1.5       Contribution of  the study   
 
A study of capital structure, ownership structure and agency costs 
could help to identify which factors are critical to the selection of a particular 
mix of capital structure. Corporate managers will then be able to obtain 
financing at the lowest possible cost and investors will be able to park their 
savings in financial markets and obtain maximum return from their 
investments. For the government, it could maximize the nation’s output and 
ensure that its limited financial resources are optimally used. 
Capulong et al. (2000) found that countries in East Asia including 
Malaysia have very concentrated corporate ownership (as measured by the 
concentration ratio of the largest shareholder and top five shareholders 
respectively). For example, as at end 1998, Malaysia’s ownership 
concentration ratio based on the largest shareholder and the top five largest 
shareholders were 30.3% and 58.8% respectively and was ranked third 
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among the five Asian countries in the study. Hence, a study of the effect of 
ownership concentration on debt-equity choice could  shed more light on this 
matter in Malaysia. The high ownership concentration setting in Malaysia and 
the emerging economies differ from the setting of widely dispersed share 
ownership structure in the West (Denis and McConnell, 2003) and as a result, 
the agency problems or conflicts in emerging economies and those in the 
West may differ. In the West, the setting as propounded by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) focused on the premise of the conflict between managers 
and owners (which is sometimes known as Type I agency conflicts). In 
Malaysia, the setting is one of high ownership concentration and the 
predominantly family-owned who is usually also the top manager. Examples 
of such firms are Genting Berhad, Genting Malaysia (previously known as 
Resorts World Berhad, YTL Corporation Berhad, Tan Chong Moptor Holdings, 
Berjaya Corporation Berhad and Berjaya Land Berhad. Hence, this  gives rise 
to conflicts between majority shareholders and minority shareholders 
(Pedersen and Thomsen, 2003) and is also known as Type II agency 
conflicts. Hence, this study provides an opportunity to examine if the majority 
shareholders are engaging in firm maximizing activities or expropriation 
activities and this study examines the effect of agency problems and 
ownership structure on capital structure.  
A natural question that often arises is whether ownership concentration 
is beneficial or detrimental to the firm in the context of Malaysia. In particular, 
does ownership concentration fulfill the role of monitoring the firm. If the 
results of this study show that ownership concentration monitors management 
then it suggests that high ownership concentration has brought positive 
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results to the firm. However, ownership concentration may also give rise to 
management entrenchment situations whereby it enriches the self-servicing 
management but is detrimental to the conpany’s minority shareholders.   
Hence, the results of this study could provide answers as to whether 
concentrated ownership brings about the desired monitoring of the 
management which will then result in the increase in firm value. 
This study uses the panel data analysis technique which is rarely used 
in local capital structure studies at the date of writing. The panel data analysis 
technique is superior than the often used ordinary least squares (OLS) 
technique in that there are more data points and it combines the time and 
cross-section effect as compared with the OLS method which averages the 
values for cross-section or time series data.  
In this study seeks mainly to examine the effect of ownership structure 
(for example, managerial shareholdings, ownership concentration, foreign 
ownership and some control variables (firm size, risk, etc.) on debt ratio, 
agency problems and firm performance. Effective monitoring by ownership 
variable will lead to less use of debt as a monitoring device, less agency 
problems and better firm performance. 
 
1.6       Scope of the study 
 
This study focuses on the Bursa Malaysia (formerly known as The 
Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange) Main Board firms from 1993 to 2003 
(covering over a lengthy period of 11 years). The main reason why the data 
set for this study was set from 1993 to 2003 is that data for one of the key 
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variables in this study (foreign ownership) was first became available in 1993 
and the foreign ownership data ceased to be available after 2003.  
In addition, during the 1993 to 2003 period, it encompasses three 
distinct scenarios of economic conditions that is a growth period (1993-1996), 
downturn period (1997-1998) and economic recovery period (1999-2003). 
Sample firms were used if it meets all the four criteria listed below: 
 i) have complete and continuous data from 1993 to 2003,  
ii) does not have zero sales,  
iii) does not have negative shareholders funds and  
iv) were non-financial Main Board Malaysian listed firms.  
 
1.7       Organization of the study 
 
This dissertation is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2 outlines the 
background to agency conflicts, corporate financing in Malaysia, external 
financing by the corporate sector, funds raised by Malaysian listed firms, debt 
ratio trends and views from practitioners in Malaysia.  
Chapter 3 provides a detailed analysis of the several main theories that 
explain capital structure as well as the empirical literature that are relevant to 
the issues in this study. Issues addressed in this chapter include capital 
structure framework, theoretical models for capital structure, previous 
empirical studies on the relationship between leverage and firm 
characteristics, capital structure decisions in the Malaysian context and the 
measurement issues of capital structure. 
               Chapter 4 focuses on the research methodology. It includes the 
research framework, operational definitions and measurement of the 
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dependent and independent variables of the study, statistical methods for 
data analysis and the sample selection procedure. 
                Chapter 5 presents the findings pertaining to the panel data 
analysis conducted to examine the impact of ownership structure and agency 
costs on capital structure decisions. The hypotheses formulated for the study 
were tested using panel data analysis. The results of the statistical analysis 
were presented. 
               Chapter 6 provides the discussion on the findings of this study. The 
final chapter, Chapter 7, concludes the study by restating the research 
objectives, summarizing the conclusions and implications of the study. The 
limitations of the study are also discussed at the penultimate end of the 
chapter. In closing, suggestions for future research are provided. 
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CHAPTER  2 
 
AGENCY CONFLICTS AND CAPITAL STRUCTURE PATTERNS IN 
MALAYSIA 
 
 
2.0       Introduction 
This chapter serves to provide some background information on 
agency conflicts and capital structure patterns in Malaysia. This chapter 
begins with an overview of the agency conflicts and is followed by an 
overview of corporate financing in Malaysia, then followed by external 
financing by the corporate sector, funds raised by listed Malaysian firms, debt 
ratio trends and finally, views from practitioners.   
 
2.1      Agency conflicts 
 This section attempts to show that owing to the differences in 
ownership structure between the West and developing countries like Malaysia 
agency conflicts may differ. Owing to dispersed ownership in the West and 
the resultant asymmetric information problems, agency conflicts in the West is 
mainly between managers (or directors) and shareholders. As shown in Table 
2.1, managerial ownership in the West (for example, the United States) of 
8.4% in 1994 (Cho, 1998) is relatively lower than that of developing countries 
(27.0% in this study for Malaysia).  
 In developing countries like Malaysia, the agency conflicts may be 
different than that of the West and it may be the case of the conflicts between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders or the Type II conflicts 
Faccio, Lang and Young (2001). This is because the majority shareholder in 
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developing countries is usually also the Chief Executive Officer or controls the 
board of directors who are the company’s top management due to their 
significant voting power and the desire to take an active role in managing the 
firms in which they have dominant shareholdings. Hence, following these 
arguments, it can be concluded that in developing countries owing to the lack 
of separation between ownership and control, the problem of asymmetric 
information may not be as serious as those in the West where there is a clear 
separation of ownership and control. 
 In terms of ownership concentration, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer and Vishny (1998) documented that ownership concentration in 
Malaysia is more than twice that in the United States (54.0% and 20.0% 
respectively) based on ownership by the three largest shareholders. This 
supports the widely held view that Malaysian companies are usually controlled 
by a small group of related parties and managed by owner-managers. In 
addition, the position of Managing Director or Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is 
a member or nominee of the controlling family (The World Bank, 2005). This 
situation is also similar to that in Thailand and Singapore (Deesomsak et al. 
2004). Hence, in Malaysia, the concentration of ownership and management 
that is in the hands of a few may result in high level of expropriation of 
minority stakeholders possibly resulting in Type II conflicts agency problems. 
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Table 2.1   
Ownership structure in the United States and Malaysia 
 
United States Malaysia Sources 
   
Managerial ownership:   
        16.1% (1988) - Bathala, Moon and Rao 
(1994) 
          8.4% (1994) - Cho (1994) 
        - 27.0% (1993-2003) In this study 
Institutional shareholding:   
        38.8% (1988) - Bathala et al. (1994) 
        52.4% (1994) - Cho (1994) 
Ownership concentration:   
20.0%* 54.0%* La Porta et al. (1998)  
-  64.8% (1998 only) Suto (2003) 
-  65.0% (1993-2003) In this study 
* based on three largest shareholders in non-financial domestic firms and  mean values. 
 
 
2.2      Corporate financing in Malaysia 
Like the other Asian countries, Malaysia has a high savings rate (Suto, 
2003) and uses this to support economic growth. This is also supported by 
Pomerleano (1998) who found that the Asian household sector saves about a 
third of Gross Domestic Product. Banks and social security funds (for 
example, Employees’ Provident Fund) in Malaysia can be regarded as the 
twin pillars of the nation’s financial system. The stock market acts as a 
channel to encourage increased Bumiputera participation in business. Under 
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the New Economic Policy, private savings was channelled to the public and 
private sector via banking institutions which follows closely to lending 
guidelines set by the government. The mortgage bond market was set up in 
1987 and this was followed by the corporate debt securities market by end of 
the 1980s. 
The 1990s marked the era of high growth in corporate debt securities. 
Please refer to Table 2.2. As a result, among the main financing tools 
available were loans and advances, equity issues and corporate debt 
securities. Suto (2003) noted that “lack of public issuance of corporate debt” 
impedes an active secondary market and there is no secondary market for 
corporate debt resulting them being held by social security funds and financial 
institutions.  
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2.3      External financing by the corporate sector       
 
 
       Table 2.2   
      External finance raised by the corporate sector 
 
Year Real GDP 
growth (%) 
Loans & 
advances1 
Equity2 Debt 
securities3 
  RM million RM million RM million 
     
1980 8.0 12,192.6 137.1 20.0 
1981 6.9 21,031.1 901.8 0 
1982 5.2 25,521.4 628.8 50.0 
1983 5.9 29,665.6 1,262.3 136.9 
1984 7.6 36,781.8 1,972.2 392.1 
1985 -1.0 43,504.3 644.5 0 
1986 1.2 48,981.7 188.6 0 
1987 5.2 52,328.7 1,384.8 395.0 
1988 8.7 52,180.7 931.2 1,880.7 
1989 8.8 56,837.6 2,508.1 1,903.6 
1990 9.8 67,141.7 8,649.6 2,602.7 
1991 8.7 80,785.0 4,391.4 2,146.2 
1992 7.8 97,206.1 9,181.5 4,383.9 
1993 8.3 105,729.1 3,432.6 5,014.0 
1994 9.2 117,235.5 8,457.9 10,266.1 
1995 9.5 134,151.0 11,616.4 12,222.7 
1996 8.6 175,007.4 15,924.4 17,048.7 
1997 7.7 178,271.4 18,358.3 19,792.5 
1998 -7.5 217,820.5 1,787.8 14,151.8 
1999 5.8 284,621.6 6,096.2 27,775.5 
2000 8.3 303,366.6 6,013.1 30,395.1 
2001 0.4 244,321.1 6,123.5 37,932.3 
2002 4.1 337,994.6 13,290.8 36,195.3 
2003 5.3 355,470.0 7,771.5 50,975.3 
2004 7.1 447,468.3 6,475.2 36,339.9 
 
1  Loans and advances refer to overdrafts, other advances, term loans and trade bills by  
   local and foreign commercial banks. 
2  Equity consists of ordinary shares (initial public offers, rights issues, private  placement/  
   restricted offer for sale and special issues), preference shares and warrants.  
3   Debt securities include straight bonds, bonds with warrants, convertible and Islamic  
   bonds but excludes bonds issued by banking institutions. 
 
Sources: Economic Report, Ministry of Finance, Malaysia and Monthly Statistical Bulletin, 
Bank Negara Malaysia, various issues. 
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Table 2.2 provides the information on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth rate, loans and advances by commercial banks and capital raised from 
the equity and debt securities both from the capital market. (Note: Capital 
market is defined by Bank Negara Malaysia as comprising of the government 
bond market, the stock market and the private debt securities market). From 
1980 to 2004, the Malaysian economy had only 2 years of negative economic 
growth (as measured by the real GDP growth) of -1.0% in 1985 and -7.5% in 
1998 due to 1985/86 recession and Asian financial crisis in July 1997. The 
end of the 1980s to mid 1990s, was a period of rapid economic growth with 
GDP growth ranging from 7.8% in 1992 to as high as 9.8% in 1990.  
One notable feature between GDP growth and loans and advances by 
commercial banks was that during periods of negative GDP growth, there was 
negative relationship between the two. In fact, when GDP was negative, there 
was a spike in loans and advances, for example, in 1985 and 1998. Since 
1980, 2001 was the only year in which there was a decline in loans and 
advances.  
In terms of equity raised from the capital market, there was no upward 
trend like loans and advances. In general, equity issues was closely linked to 
periods of economics growth that is during periods of high economic growth 
for example, 1990 and 1994/95, there was a surge in equity issues. From the 
1980s and early 1990s, capital raised from equity had been way ahead of 
funds raised from debt securities. However, since 1993, funds raised from 
debt securities far exceeded that of equity by a wide margin (almost six-fold) 
in 2004.        
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2.4       Funds raised by Malaysian listed firms    
To get a clearer view on how Malaysian listed firms source capital in 
recent years (1998-2003), Table 2.3 provides the evidence. As the data 
source (Securities Commission of Malaysia) was formed in 1997, the data 
only for the post-financial crisis period. In the six year period from 1998 to 
2003, Malaysian listed firms prefer debt than equity except for 2000 and 2003. 
The percentage of debt to total funds raised among listed companies ranged 
from as low as 36.0% in 2003 to as high as 80.5% in 2001. Within fund raising 
from debt, funds raised from pure debt far exceeded that from irredeemable 
cumulative unsecured loan stock. 
Equity financing from listed local firms ranged from as low as 19.5% of 
the total funds raised in 2001 to as high as 73.7% in 1999. Within equity fund 
raising, ordinary share issue was the most popular source of equity funds 
followed by initial public offerings. During 1998 to 2003, the largest amount of 
funds raised by ordinary share issues were RM6.8 billion in 1999. Preference 
share issue was the least popular source of equity financing and the largest 
amount of funds raised was only RM800.0 million in 2001. In 1998, 2000, 
2002 and 2003, no financing was obtained from preference shares. One of 
the possible reasons for the lack of interest in preference shares in Malaysia 
could be that preference shares only get preference or priority in terms of 
dividend payment but also  participate in the profits of the firm but should the 
firm be wound up, preference shareholders are ranked after the creditors 
when it comes to distribution of assets. 
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Table 2.3  
Funds raised by Malaysian listed  firms (in RM million) 
 
Type1 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
       
Equity2:       
  Initial public  
  Offerings 
473.9 931.8 3,286.6 887.4 2,377.5 3,275.3 
  Ordinary 
  Shares 
848.9 6,753.6 6,224.8 3,779.6 4,704.0 3,871.3 
  Preference 
  Shares 
0 6.8 0 800.0 0 0 
Sub-total (1) 1,323.8 7,692.4 9,511.4 5,466.8 7,081.5 7,146.6 
Debt:       
  Pure debt 1,806.0 20,843.0 5,835.0 21,513.0 8,344.3 4,024.5 
  ICULS 949.3 738.6 679.4 1068.8 1,204.4 N.A. 
Sub-total (2) 2,755.3 21,581.6 6,514.4 22,581.8 9,548.7 4,024.5 
Total (1) + 
(2) 
4,079.1 29,274.0 16,025.8 28,048.6 16,630.2 11,171.1 
Equity as % 
of total 
32.5 26.3 59.4 19.5 42.5 64.0 
Debt as % of 
total 
67.5 73.7 40.6 80.5 57.5 36.0 
 
 
1  Refers to each type of individual issues approved to be undertaken by listed firms. 
2  Excludes private placement and restricted issues. 
Pure debt refers to debt without conversion features like ICULS. 
ICULS is irredeemable cumulative unsecured loan stock. 
 
Source: Securities Commission of Malaysia, Annual Report, various issues. 
 
 
2.5       Debt ratio trends    
Table 2.4 provides the mean debt-asset ratios in terms of book value 
which were then further sub-divided into three mean debt-equity ratios: total 
debt-to-total assets ratio (TD), short-term debt-to-total assets ratio (STD) and 
long-term debt-to total assets ratio (LTD).  Note: Debt in this study refers to 
interest-bearing debts (for example, bank overdraft and bonds issued by the 
firm) and had been used by researchers such as Harijono, Ariff and Tanewski 
(2004). 
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An examination of Table 2.4 revealed that all three mean debt-to-asset 
ratios can be considered relatively low among Malaysian listed firms during 
the period from 1993 to 2003. Using all three debts ratios mentioned above, 
the highest debt ratio was 0.24 in 1998 and the lowest debt ratio was 0.05 in 
1993. In terms of total debt to total asset ratio, the highest level was 0.24 in 
1998 that just after the 1997 financial crisis and the lowest level was 0.15 in 
1993. The mean book value short-term debt ratios range between 0.10 in 
1993 to 0.13 in 1999 and 2000.  The mean book value long-term debt ratios 
range between 0.05 in 1993 to 0.11 in 2003.  
 
 
Table 2.4   
Annual Trend of Debt Ratios 
 
Year Total debt to total 
assets ratio (TD)* 
Short-term debt to total 
assets ratio (STD)* 
Long-term debt to total 
assets ratio (LTD)* 
1993 0.151 0.101 0.050 (lowest) 
1994 0.160 0.106 0.054 
1995 0.165 0.103 0.063 
1996 0.173 0.101 0.072 
1997 0.207 0.114 0.093 
1998 0.235 (highest) 0.129 0.107 
1999 0.228 0.130 0.098 
2000 0.226 0.130 0.097 
2001 0.227 0.125 0.102 
2002 0.224 0.128 0.096 
2003 0.229 0.118 0.110 
* mean values. 
 
Source: this study. 
 
 
Table 2.4 also shows the annual trend of three debt ratios (based on 
book values) from 1993 to 2003 for the samples used in this study. From 
Table 2.4 and Figure 2.1, all three debt ratios indicate an increasing trend. In 
fact, all three debt ratios revealed a significant increase in debt ratios in 1997 
mainly due to the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in that year. For 
example, the mean total debt-to-total asset ratio increased sharply from 0.15 
 24 
during 1993-1996 to 0.24 from 1997-1998 and had been about maintained at 
an average of 0.23 during the 1999-2003 period. A noteworthy feature is that 
mean debt levels (for all three measures of debt) has more or less been 
maintained at around 1997 financial crisis levels even after six years after the 
crisis in 2003.  
Figure 2.1 shows that the mean yearly debt ratio trends in this study. 
As measured by book value of debt ratios (TD, STD and LTD), there has been 
an uptrend from 1993-2003. However, debt ratios increased sharply in 1997 
as a result of the Asian financial crisis and has remained rather flat since 
1998. This is probably the result of the financial crisis which caused many 
firms to incur losses and had to increase borrowings.  
One striking feature that is observed is that from 1993 to 2003, STD 
had always been more than LTD that Malaysian firms use more short-term 
debt than long–term debt as they roll-over the short term debt (Pandey, 2004). 
However, in 2003, for the first time, it is interesting to note that the LTD ratios 
almost matched that of the STD ratio.  One possible reason for this scenario 
is that firms have learnt their lesson from the past Asian financial crisis are 
using more long-term debt to finance their expansion rather than relying on 
short-term debt as in the past. Another reason could be firms could lock in the 
low interest rate for long-term debt rather to face the volatility of short-term 
interest rates if interest rates were to increase in future. 
